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The most significant merit of Martti Koskenniemi’s legal epistemology consists in decisively radi-
calizing the “linguistic turn” in jurisprudence. This radicalization entails the claim that law should 
be understood not only as a specific language, but as a language without truth content, regard-
less of whether this truth is assumed to have universal or even only contextual validity. The inno-
vative potential of Koskenniemi’s approach becomes even more evident if we consider it in the 
light of a short overview of the main strands of legal philosophy. However, the most far-going 
assertion of Koskenniemi’s legal philosophy – namely that legal propositions do not contain any 
inherent truth content, nor do they refer to an external source of reliable validity – is also its most 
contestable tenet. Indeed, the most recent philosophy of language maintains that neither lan-
guage in general, nor the language of the law in particular, can be regarded as devoid of truth 
content. As a consequence, the legal professional cannot be just allowed to use the law as an 
instrument at the service of his/her preferences, but should justify his/her position by resorting 
to the linguistic content in which law, without assuming a metaphysical or ontological substance, 
is lastly rooted.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Martti Koskenniemi’s large influence on theory and praxis of contemporary law, in general, 
and of international law in particular, is mainly related to his many and brilliant analyses of 
the most contested issues of contemporary international law – in the most cases drawn from 
his direct experience as a legal adviser and as a member of international legal committees – 
as well as to his highly appraised contributions to the reconstructions of some of the mile-
stones in the history of international law. Somehow outside the main interests of the legal 
academic community – therefore taken for granted and less discussed – is, instead, the epis-
temology that deeply informs his work. Yet, on these epistemological assumptions depends 
not only Koskenniemi’s (international) law theory but also his interpretation of the case law 
as well as his understanding of the legal adviser’s role. In fact, the preference for a certain 
epistemology – not just in Koskenniemi’s work, but generally – paves the way for a specific 
conception of the law, for asserting the relation of the law to other social subsystems, and – 
last but not least – for outlining the (allegedly) unique identity of the legal professionals. As a 
result, concentrating on his epistemology should not be regarded as a pure academic 
amusement, with little consequences for a better comprehension of how law works as well 
as of the distinctive features of the legal profession, but rather – quite to the contrary – as 
an essential component of precisely that comprehension.  
In short, Koskenniemi’s epistemological conception maintains that law should be con-
ceived of not as a formal expression of a kind of ontological and metaphysical “truth” to be 
found outside the linguistic form of the utterances that are defined as “law”, but has to be 
analyzed with special regard to the structure of precisely those utterances.1 Going more into 
details, this general assumption can be split up into five distinct claims. The first is that the 
law can be best understood if we interpret it as a specific language; in this sense, the most 
excellent legal theory is the theory that addresses the linguistic structure of the law. Second, 
the law does not refer to any truth content outside the legal discourse; therefore, no onto-
logical basis and no normative claims outside the law guarantee for the validity of legal 
propositions. The third claim is that the law has no inherent truth content either, regardless 
of whether this is supposed to have a normative or a functional character. Fourth, although 
                                                 
*  Professor of Public Law and State Theory at the University of Turin (Italy), Faculty of Law; co-director of 
the research project entitled “Paradigms of Public Order” at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg (Germany), email: sergio.dellavalle@unito.it; del-
lavalle@mpil.de.  
1  Koskenniemi explicitly states that “From Apology to Utopia seeks … to go beyond metaphor. Instead of 
examining international law like a language it treats it as a language” (From Apology to Utopia: The Struc-
ture of International Legal Argument, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 2005, at 568). 
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legal concepts are deeply related to social power, they do not limit themselves to mirroring 
the reality of social relations; as linguistic expressions, to the contrary, they are character-
ized by a dialectic relationship to the reality both in the sense that legal concepts are defined 
by interpretation and that their interpretation may be highly contested. The fifth claim – 
and, at the same time, the conclusion that can be drawn from the former assumptions – is 
that the normativity of the law can only be based on its formalism, without any reference to 
whatsoever truth content or to clear-cut references to the social context. On the basis of this 
general framework of interpretation, the first Section reconstructs Koskenniemi’s epistemo-
logical theory as it is laid down, mainly, in his From Apology to Utopia, and secondarily in 
many other texts (II.). 
Yet, the novelty of Koskenniemi’s approach can only be understood if we consider it 
against the background of the main strands of legal philosophy (III.). The purpose of the 
short overview in the second Section is to show that legal philosophy, for the most part of its 
history, sought the basis for the validity of the law in something which was not law itself, 
although this “something” was of a quite different shape in the different philosophical tradi-
tions. Furthermore, even when legal theory began to locate the validity of the law within the 
legal discourse, the claim for self-reliance led eventually to self-contradictory results. In a 
last move, the awareness of the close relationship between law and language emerged in 
legal theory; yet, the potentially pathbreaking intuition was limited to nothing more than a 
clue, and no linguistic instruments were concretely applied to the analysis of the law.  
Having set the scene, Koskenniemi’s understanding of the law is then compared, in a 
further step, with the approaches outlined in the second Section (IV.). From this perspective, 
Koskenniemi’s theory represents a great innovation for at least two reasons: first, law is ana-
lyzed by using the conceptual tools provided by linguistics and philosophy of language; sec-
ond, his interpretation of the law as self-reliant, non-normative language without truth con-
tent is unprecedented because of both its intellectual radicalness and philosophical ambi-
tion. Due to Koskenniemi’s contribution, the “linguistic turn” – maybe the most significant 
novelty of the 20th century’s philosophy – made lastly its unrestrained entry into jurispru-
dence, now not just as a marginal element but as the core of the theory, developing thus its 
full potential of conceptual deconstruction.2  
The practical consequence that Koskenniemi draws from his legal theory is that pre-
cisely because the legal language has no truth content in itself, it is up to the legal profes-
sional to give a sense to the law according to his/her priorities. In other words, exactly the 
lack of a truth content in the legal language enables the legal professional to use the law as 
an instrument at the service of his/her – lastly not rationally justifiable – preferences. Yet, 
Koskenniemi’s claim is far from self-evident. Indeed – as I will show in the fourth Section – 
neither language in general, nor the language of the law – as a specific kind of linguistic in-
teraction – are without truth content. A few examples will illustrate that the most important 
strands of contemporary philosophy of language deny any evidence supporting a turn to a 
radical neo-Wittgensteinian contextualism and scepticism (V.). 
Yet, Koskenniemi’s drastic denial of any truth content of the law is the only assumption 
that can substantiate his decisionism in explaining the role of the legal adviser. Instead, if we 
admit that the language of the law has a truth content, the legal professionals will have to 
                                                 
2  Emmanuelle Jouannet, A Critical Introduction, in: Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 
Hart, Oxford/Portland 2011, at 9. 
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justify their position – and their use of the legal instruments – by resorting to that kind of 
content in which law is rooted. However, insofar as this content is not just mediated but 
downright constructed by linguistic interaction, the rootedness of the law finds its explica-
tion – as it will be sketched in the last Section – without having recourse to any extra-




II. On Koskenniemi’s Epistemology and Its Consequences for the Understanding of the Law 
and the Self-Understanding of Lawyers  
 
Koskenniemi’s epistemology is, at first, a legal epistemology, addressing mainly the question 
whether legal propositions contain a provable and coherent reference to phenomena, facts 
or actions, and thus to a “true” knowledge of the world. Nevertheless, from his considera-
tions on the epistemological quality of the law can lastly be inferred a much broader as-
sumption concerning a general theory of knowledge – an assumption that actually denies 
both the possibility of true knowledge as well as the existence of a universal rationality. 
The first relevant element of Koskenniemi’s approach consists in his focusing on the 
epistemological dimension of law by concentrating the analysis on its language. In other 
words, the attention is not drawn on whether legal propositions reflect phenomena, facts or 
preferences that are thought to be true, nor on to which extent they can do that, but rather 
on the structure of legal propositions in their relationship to each other. Therefore, the focus 
is here on the language of law itself, and not on the external truth that the law is assumed to 
express. Starting from these premises, the results of Koskenniemi’s inquiry are quite destruc-
tive for the epistemological content of the law. Indeed, his analysis unveils what he calls the 
“substantive indeterminacy” of law,3 in particular of international law. This happens by lead-
ing back the international law discourse to couples of concepts, or to “binary oppositions”,4 
which appear to be – at least at first glance – opposite, so that just one of them should be 
presumed to be correctly applied in a specific situation. Thus, given the opposite couple of 
legal concept A–B and given that they should be employed to the state of affairs X, if it can 
be justified to apply A, then the application of B to X should be regarded as false. Resorting 
to one of the examples proposed by Koskenniemi, the principles of self-determination and of 
uti possidetis build such a “binary opposition”, in which the application of one principle 
should exclude the application of the other.5 Yet, the reduction of the international law dis-
course to such a seemingly well-ordered linguistic structure turns out to be an illusion, ac-
cording to Koskenniemi’s interpretation, for two main reasons. First, the concepts forming 
“binary oppositions”, although assumed to rule out overlapping applications, are in fact, 
from the semantic perspective, no less mutually dependent on each other than mutually ex-
clusive. Going back to the former example, as Koskenniemi claims, “self-government is only 
                                                 
3  Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, supra n. 2, at 298. 
4  Id. 
5  Quoted by Emmanuelle Jouannet, A Critical Introduction, in: Koskenniemi, The Politics of International 
Law, supra n. 2, at 8. 
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possible within a fixed territory; and the authority of existing power can only be justified by 
reference to some idea of self-government.”6 
The second reason for the indeterminacy of international law discourse does not refer 
to the meaning of its concepts in their relationship to each other but rather to their role, as 
concepts, in connection to the world outside. The explanation of this question requires some 
general considerations on the relationship between the law, in this case international law, 
and the field of human interaction, in this case the interactions in the international arena, 
for the regulation of which it is conceived. According to Koskenniemi, international law ar-
gumentations aim at the same time at two contrasting goals: “concreteness” and “norma-
tivity”. By “concreteness” is meant that the law has “to be verifiable, or justifiable, inde-
pendently of what anyone might think that the law should be.”7 Thus, a proposition of the 
international law discourse is regarded as “concrete” if it does not just take into account but 
downright reflects the real conditions of the actors’ interactions within the international 
arena. On the other hand, “normativity” means that the law “is to be applicable even against 
a state (or other legal subject) which opposed its application to itself.”8 In other words, it be-
longs to the concept of law, and of international law as well, that it may – and in many cases 
should – oppose the preferences of the involved actors. The problem is that these two es-
sential aims of international law – or, we could say, of law in general – namely concreteness 
and normativity, do not just oppose each other, which is quite self-evident, but also always 
imply each other. Indeed, every norm, rule or principle, as well as every argument of inter-
national law has to be “concrete” so as to be effective. However, if its “concreteness” turns 
out to be nothing else than the formal expression – and justification – of the real conditions 
of power, then the language of international law would lose that counter-factual dimension 
which is essential to the very concept of the law, becoming a mere apology of the existing 
state of social and political interactions and a defence of the injustice that may grow out of 
it. On the other hand, if the legal discourse only insists, in order to maintain its “normativi-
ty”, on its opposition to reality, largely ignoring how it can have a relevant impact on it, it 
degenerates into what Koskenniemi calls a sheer utopia. Therefore, in order to be “con-
crete” the international law discourse always runs the risk of being apologetic – and, in order 
not to lose its “normativity”, it is structurally in danger of becoming utopian.  
As a result, the indeterminacy of law is determined by a twofold contradiction: the first 
one depends on the mutual reference of (allegedly) opposite concepts; and the second one 
is due to the attitude of the international law discourse which swings between apology and 
utopia. As regards the second contradiction, it could also be admitted that it is part of the 
most essential social function of the law, the norms of which must be counter-factual so as 
to bring about order in spontaneous and therefore rather disordered social interactions, and 
at the same time cannot ignore the conditions of reality so as to avoid ineffectiveness and, 
thus, uselessness. Yet, the way that contemplates the admission of the inescapability of ten-
sions between legal discourse and reality is not the one chosen by Koskenniemi. Nor he con-
siders the missing “objectivism” of the international law discourse amendable through a re-
form of its epistemology and its better adaptation to the world outside. Indeed, according to 
Koskenniemi’s epistemology, the legal discourse is evidently lacking a proper truth content; 
                                                 
6  Id. 
7  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra n. 1, at 513. 
8  Id. 
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yet, this deficit cannot be resolved by an improvement of the theoretical organon of the le-
gal discourse simply because no universal rationality can be found in that world of social in-
teraction either, to which the law should give rules. Not just the language of the law, thus, is 
missing truth content, but our knowledge in general – according to Koskenniemi’s approach 
– does not lead to any proposition of universal validity.  
The consequence of Koskenniemi’s epistemological scepticism, which takes up the 
premises of postmodern philosophy,9 is that the legal discourse cannot but be a question of 
“interpretation”, for which we cannot claim any solid rational foundation that could make it 
acceptable for every reasonable human being.10 The criticism of the universalistic claim of 
the legal discourse in general, and of the international law discourse in particular, does not 
lead nevertheless to sheer nihilism. Indeed, Koskenniemi does not reject the idea that some 
experiences may occur which are not characterized by mere contingency but, on the contra-
ry, assume a kind of universal scope.11 From the postmodern standpoint, however, this un-
assuming universality is not based on abstract ontological, moral or epistemological princi-
ples, but is derived from the continuity of the concrete experience of vulnerability among all 
individuals involved. According to Koskenniemi, artistic expression is probably the most suit-
able way to give voice to the universal scope of a humanity made of concrete human be-
ings.12 But legal discourse can also play a role in accomplishing this task. In fact, due to its 
formalism,13 the law makes possible that, “engaging in legal discourse, persons recognize 
each other as carriers of rights and duties” which “belong to every member of the communi-
ty in that position”. Through the law – Koskenniemi adds – “what otherwise would be a mere 
private violation, a wrong done to me, a violation of my interest, is transformed ... into a vio-
lation against everyone in my position, a matter of concern for the political community it-
self.”14 The formalism to which Koskenniemi refers is of course something quite different 
from the formal rationalism of modern philosophy, as it has been developed in particular by 
Kant.15 Rather, it is a “culture of formalism … that builds on formal arguments that are avail-
able to all under conditions of equality.”16 When they apply the “culture of formalism”, the 
actors of international law, in particular lawyers [and] decision makers, “take a momentary 
distance from their preferences and … enter a terrain where these preferences should be 
justified, instead of taken for granted, by reference to standards that are independent from 
their particular positions or interests.”17 Among the consequences are “limits to the exercise 
of power” and the “message … that those who are in position of strength must be accounta-
                                                 
9  For a critique of the impact of postmodern thinking on legal theory, in particular on comparative law, see: 
Anne Peters, Heiner Schwenke, ‘Comparative Law beyond Post-modernism’ [2000], 49 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 800. 
10  Id., at 478. 
11  Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in Europe between Tradition and Renewal’ [2005], 16 European 
Journal of International Law 113, at 119 ff. 
12  Id., at 120. 
13  Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nation: The Rise and fall of International Law 1870–1960, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 2001, at 500 ff. 
14  Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ [2004], 17 Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs 197, at 214. 
15  Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nation, supra n. 13, at 500. 
16  Id., at 501. 
17  Id. 
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ble and that those who are weak must be heard and protected.”18 The discourse based on 
legal formalism involves “professional men and women” who, by engaging “in an argument 
about what is lawful and what is not, … are engaged in a politics that imagines the possibility 
of a community overriding particular alliances and preferences and allowing a meaningful 
distinction between lawful constraint and the application of naked power.”19 
Following Koskenniemi’s interpretation, the law has no truth content because no uni-
versal rationality can be presumed. Nevertheless, we can assume a non-ontological, non-
moral and non-epistemological universalism that originates from legal formalism. Against 
this background, Koskenniemi formulates his conclusive claim: the law, as a consequence of 
the fact that it does not refer any longer to a universal rationality, becomes a formal instru-
ment that can be used to quite different purposes. The question on which goal should be 
pursued by resorting to the formal means of the law depends actually on the personal deci-
sion made by the legal professional.20 Without universal rationality, indeed, no universal ob-
ligation to freedom, justice, democracy, or to any other value can be justified; only personal 
preferences can lead the legal professional to commit him-/herself to these goals. Kosken-
niemi’s epistemological relativism, however, does not end in political indifference or cyni-
cism. Quite to the contrary, his inclinations are clear and the commitment of his whole life in 
favour of them is hardly questionable. Yet, his dedication to the defence of human rights 
does not rely on reasons of universal validity, but is presented as an unpretentious, though 
steady, personal and political decision. In fact, Koskenniemi points out that “political views 
can be held without having to believe in their objectivity and that they can be discussed 
without having to assume that in the end everybody should agree.”21 Even if we give up – 
following Koskenniemi’s approach – the formulation of a universally valid “method”, the 
“commitment to the whole, to peace and world order” remains.22 But, insofar as this com-
mitment is now understood as an individual decision and not as a rational principle pre-
sumed to be universally suitable, law itself, which in the traditional understanding was 
thought to be the formal and effective expression of a universal rationality and of a shared 
truth, cannot but re-modulate and actually reduce its ambitions. Far from being the synthe-
sis of a uniform and compelling normativity, it is now rather a practical instrument for the 
solution of problems, or “a practice of attempting to reach the most acceptable solution in 
the particular circumstances of the case.”23 
Concluding, Koskenniemi’s relativism in epistemological matters and decisionism in po-
litical questions leads to the result that the defence of human rights – or of any other value – 
is not a universal moral duty the accomplishment of which can be demanded from every 
human being, but it is a task that committed people assume because of their specific sensi-
bility – or empathy – towards the suffering of their fellow humans. As regards the profession 
of the lawyer, Koskenniemi’s approach eventually leads to a pleading in favour of the role of 
legal advisers, who skilfully use the instruments put at their disposal by the formalism of the 
                                                 
18  Id., at 502. 
19  Id. 
20  “International law is what international lawyers make of it” (Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra 
n. 1, at 615). 
21  Id., at 536. 
22  Id., at 556. 
23  Id., at 544. 
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III. Searching for the Foundation of Law until the “Linguistic Turn” in Jurisprudence 
 
If we want to understand properly the significance of the turn that Koskenniemi introduced 
in legal philosophy, we should set the scene. Concretely, this means that we have to look at 
his contribution from the perspective of what have been the dominant interpretations be-
fore. Koskenniemi’s innovation concentrates mainly on the assumptions, first, of an essential 
relationship between law and language; second, of the non-cognitive character of the law, 
which cannot aim, therefore, at reaching any kind of truth; third, of the constitutive self-
reliance of the legal discourse; fourth, of the dependence of legal concepts’ interpretation 
on social power; and, fifth, of the normativity of the law as a result of pure formalism, with-
out any ambition to be the language and praxis that enshrine shared and rationally justifia-
ble social values. As a consequence of the specific contents of Koskenniemi’s epistemology, 
we are allowed to reconstruct the main tendencies in the history of legal philosophy – in a 
way that is surely far from exhaustive – along only four questions:25 1) how legal philoso-
phers grounded the validity of the law by linking the legal discourse to an external source of 
truth, whereas this source is regarded as entailing normative claims; 2) how a second strand 
tried to achieve the same goal of grounding the validity of the law by searching inside the 
legal discourse; 3) how a third strand began to locate the source of the validity of the law in 
social power, thus in an external foundation endowed with almost exclusively factual au-
thority; 4) how the awareness of the profound connection between law and language made 
its entry into legal philosophy. Lastly, the originality of Koskenniemi’s interpretation of the 
law will be regarded as sufficiently substantiated if no one of its main tenets was consistent-
ly anticipated by any significant legal philosopher or strand of legal philosophy before him. 
 
 
1. The Ontological Foundation of Validity and Normativity of the law 
 
The theories that postulate that the law has to find the foundation of its validity outside it-
self generally situate this foundation in the ontological element that also constitutes the 
normative basis for social order. In other words, the fundament of a just and “well-ordered” 
society also provides the guarantee for the validity and normativity of the law. Depending on 
which ontological element is meant to be the fundament of a just order, and therefore, on 
which paradigm of social order26 is respectively put at the centre of the theory on the validi-
ty of the law, we can distinguish three different approaches. 
                                                 
24  Id., at 553. 
25  The questions correspond to the first four assumptions at the basis of Koskenniemi’s epistemology and 
are thought to highlight the novelty of his approach, whereas for the fifth assumption – as the conse-
quence of the originality of the former claims and as the quintessence of Koskenniemi’s conception – no 
proper correspondence can be found in previous strands of legal philosophy. 
26  On the “paradigms of order” see: Armin von Bogdandy, Sergio Dellavalle, Universalism Renewed. Ha-
bermas’ Theory of International Order in Light of Competing Paradigms, in: “German Law Journal”, 
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a) Following the most ancient understanding of social order in the Western tradition – 
an understanding that we can describe as holistic particularism – a just and stable order is 
only possible within limited and quite homogeneous communities. According to this prem-
ise, the validity of the law is based on the same ontological foundation of social homogeneity 
that also assures, in general, social order. However, we can identify in the history of political 
thought distinct variants of holistic particularism, each of them characterized by the centrali-
ty of one distinct and specific ontological element. The earliest of these variants was devel-
oped by Plato, the first Western thinker who emancipated the law from myth and tried to 
ground it on a rational basis. In Plato’s perspective, law is not just what the public power – 
the state or the polis – has decided. Rather, the law should be able “to discover what is”,27 
that means the essence of the political community which is not primarily strength towards 
external enemies, but “friendship and peace” within the polis.28 In order to realize these two 
main goals of political life, the polis should be established on the principle of “justice”, which 
anyway has a quite different meaning in Plato’s philosophy than in our contemporary inter-
pretation. Indeed, according to Plato justice has nothing to do with the distribution of re-
sources, but is the condition in which everyone implements the activity for which he has the 
most relevant natural predisposition.29 Thus, a society is “just” if it is conceived of as an or-
ganic body in which every part or member can do his own work, and is “unjust” if the divi-
sion of labour is not sufficiently accomplished and there is a somehow inefficient overlap-
ping of activities as well as a general tendency to interfere with occupations and decisions 
outside the sphere of the own competencies. As a result, the law is the system of norms that 
makes justice – i.e., the organic division of labour – possible, and injustice – i.e., actions in 
field of competences different from the ones we have by nature – impossible. 
Let us leave asides the question as to why this understanding of “justice” is not only 
unusual but downright inacceptable for us, and let us concentrate on how the idea of the 
ontological basis for the external validity of the law was developed after Plato. Indeed, Pla-
to’s idea of social homogeneity proved to be far too demanding already during his lifetime. 
In a period in which the cohesion of the Greek polis was fading away, the individuals could 
not see the self-identification with the aims of their politeia as the one and only purpose of 
their life any longer. The social cohesion – and with this also the law that had to express it – 
needed to rest on a new fundament, and the author who gave to this question a ground-
breaking answer that deeply influenced the political thought for almost two thousand years 
was Aristotle. In fact, he not only proposed a new definition of “justice” according to which it 
is essentially related – in a way that is much nearer to our sensibility – to the principles that 
guides the distribution of resources and advantages following reasonable and justifiable cri-
teria,30 but also located the highest goal of practical life not in the service for the political 
community, as Plato did, but in what he called the “theoretical” or “contemplative” life.31 
Nevertheless, he maintained – like Plato – the necessity of an organic and holistic under-
standing of the politeia. Yet, why should the members of the political community owe soli-
                                                                                                                                                        
Vol. 10, 5–29; Sergio Dellavalle, Dalla comunità particolare all’ordine universale. Vol. I: I paradigmi 
storici, ESI, Napoli 2011. 
27  Plato, Minos, in: Plato, The Works, London 1860, Vol. IV, 313b et seq. 
28  Plato, Laws, Dover, Mineola (NY) 2006, 626b et seq. 
29  Plato, The Republic, Collier, New York 1901, Book IV, 433b. 
30  Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, London 1890, Book V, Chapter 5, 1134a. 
31  Id., X, 7, 1177a. 
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darity to each other if their most essential aim consists in living a life characterized by the 
individual searching for the theoretical truth and by its contemplation? On which fundament 
can the loyalty to the social group be based? Aristotle’s answer is astonishingly plain and in-
tuitively convincing at the same time: because all members of the political community be-
long to an enlarged family, so that they have to support the community as every good family 
member is expected to do as regards his/her relatives.32 As a result, the law itself cannot but 
be the expression of this family-based community, finding its validity in its principles. 
The familistic justification for social order and for the validity of the law was a huge 
success in political thought. However, in the Modern Ages it degenerated progressively into 
a mere validation of the absolutistic monarchic power.33 Therefore, as the crowned heads 
began to tremble in Europe and America, and were substituted by republics by the two great 
revolutions of the late 18th century, the sustainers of the particularistic-holistic interpreta-
tion of society were once again in search for a new foundation of social order and of the va-
lidity of the law. This was found in the idea of the nation, understood not primarily as the 
community of citizens, but rather – as it came up as the consequence of the reshaping of the 
concept of nation in the countries on the Eastern side of the Rhine – as the quasi-natural 
Gemeinschaft of the members of the Volk, namely of those who in German are called the 
Volksgenossen. The conception developed by the political romanticism34 and the German 
Historical School, according to which law not just reflects the identity of the “national” 
community but has to be downright devoted to foster it,35 has deeply inspired the legal 
thinking far beyond the German linguistic area in which it was elaborated. Its influence up to 
the present is mirrored by the scepticism with which some traditions of constitutional adju-
dication meet supranational legal and political integration, and by the arguments that are 
brought into the debate to support the overcautious attitude.36 
b) The first paradigmatic revolution in the theories of order brought the transition 
from the idea that order is only possible within the particular and homogeneous communi-
ties and not between them, to the conviction that order is, in principle, extendable to the 
whole humanity. Yet order, although understood with a cosmopolitan range, was conceived 
as no less organic and holistic than in the older paradigm:  indeed, the community remains 
also in this paradigm not only genetically but also ontologically and axiologically superior to 
the individuals as its members; simply, the community is here so widened as to comprehend 
the whole humankind. The new paradigm – which we can call holistic universalism – was in-
troduced by the Stoic philosophers.37 It was however with its further development by the 
Christian political theology – both on the Catholic and on the Protestant, in particular Calvin-
                                                 
32  Aristotle, Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1967, Book I, Chapter 2, 1252b. 
33  We can see the beginning of this process in the work of Jean Bodin; see: Jean Bodin, Six livres de la ré-
publique, Imprimerie de Jean de Tournes, Lyon 1579 (1st ed. 1576). The defence of the absolutistic mo-
narchic power becomes then the central issue in: John Filmer, Patriarcha, Or the Natural Power of 
Kings, Richard Chiswell, London 1680. 
34  Adam Müller, Die Elemente der Staatskunst, Fischer, Jena 1922 (1st ed. 1809), I, IV, at 76 et seq. 
35  See: infra, III.4. 
36  See, in particular the sentences of the German Federal Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) with regard to 
the Maastricht Treaty (BVerfGE 89, 155) and to the Lisbon Treaty (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009), as 
well as the declaration of the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) concerning the Consti-
tutional Treaty (Tribunal Constitucional, Declaracion de 13 de diciembre de 2004, 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/01/04/pdfs/T00005-00021.pdf). 
37  Johannes von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, Vol. I and III, Teubneri, Lipsiae 1903–1905. 
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ist, side – that the holistic-universalistic conception of order became influent on the legal 
thought, addressing also the question where the fundament of the validity of the law had to 
be located. The Christian theology of the Middle Ages situated the last source of the validity 
of the law in God’s revelation: it was in the universal scope of the Christian revelation that 
the universalism of the Christian idea of order was grounded, and it was in the command of 
God that the mundane authority was lastly justified. According to this principle, Thomas 
Aquinas derived explicitly the positive law (lex humana or lex positiva) from God’s law (lex 
divina), though passing through the mediation of natural law (lex naturalis) and jus gentium 
as well as of the doctrine of the Church.38 This conception was then resumed by the School 
of Salamanca in the early Modern Ages and transformed, in particular by Francisco Suarez, in 
a highly differentiated and innovative systematics of public law that, in its multilevel setting, 
anticipates some contemporary approaches.39 
From the perspective of the Calvinist theology, on the contrary, the way of the direct 
derivation of the validity of the law from God’s will had been shut down since the possibility 
of grasping the divine truth by means of reason had been made impossible – according to 
the Protestant doctrine – by human original sin. Therefore, the legal philosophers influenced 
by Protestantism had to seek elsewhere the source of the reasons why and under which 
conditions the law should be regarded as valid. They found it by going back to the old Stoic 
concept of οικέιωσις, namely to the idea that all human beings are bound to each other by a 
natural tendency to “sociability”. In particular, the alleged social “essence” of humans was 
regarded as the basis for the universal norms of international law.40 Interestingly, the foun-
dation of international law on the assumption of the existence of a universal community of 
humans sharing fundamental interests and values has remained important up to the pre-
sent, specifically within the so-called “theory of the constitutionalization of international 
law.”41 
c) The second paradigmatic revolution in the theories of order overturned the former 
hierarchy between community and individuals: if within the former paradigms the whole of 
the community was thought to be in any sense superior to the sum of its members, now the 
centre of social order is put in the rights, interests and rational capacity of the individuals, 
whereas authority – and public law as well – is only justified if it aims at the protection of 
individual rights and interests. The revolution from holism to individualism was initiated by 
Thomas Hobbes and then carried forward by the major exponents of modern contractual-
ism, explicitly Locke, Rousseau and, in particular, Kant. Common to all these authors is the 
                                                 
38  Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica [1265–1273], W. Benton-Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago 1980, 
Part II, Section I, Article 91 ff. 
39  Francisco Suarez, De legibus, ac Deo legislatore [1612], in: Francisco Suarez, Selections from three 
Works, Clarendon Press, Oxford  1944, at 1 ff. 
40  Alberico Gentili, De jure belli libri tres [1612], Clatendon Press, Oxford 1933; Hugo Grotius, De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis [1646], William S. Hein & Co., Buffalo (New York) 1995, “Prolegomena”, No. 6. 
41  See: Alfred Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, Springer, Wien/Berlin 1926; Christian 
Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, “Collected 
Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law”, Vol. 281, Nijhoff, The Hague 1999; Andreas L. Pau-
lus, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht. Eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung des Völkerrechts 
im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, Beck, München 2001; Mehrdad Payandeh, Internationales Gemeinschafts-
recht, Springer, Heidelberg 2010; Thomas Kleinlein, Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht, Springer, Hei-
delberg 2012. On the constitutional dimensions of international law, see: Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, Geir 
Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2011. 
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idea that public law is insofar legitimate – and thus valid – as it derives its content from 
those rights of the individuals the safeguard of which is at the origin of the fictional contract 
that grounds social and political life. Starting from this shared premise, however, the posi-
tions of the contractualist philosophers separated from each other significantly, depending 
on which rights are regarded as the most fundamental and, thus, on how far-reaching the 
alienation of rights by the individuals is in conjunction with the establishment of the societas 
civilis. Concretely, according to Hobbes law will be valid if it fulfils this task of protecting the 
life of the citizens – or, rather, of the subjects – since the protection of life is the most essen-
tial task for the realisation of which the societas civilis has been constituted and the right to 
life is the only one which is not transferred to the “Leviathan” through the pactum unionis.42 
To the contrary, Locke believed that law should protect in particular the spontaneous inter-
actions – specifically, the economic transactions – of the members of the newly established 
Commonwealth,43 and Rousseau assigned to it the mission of expressing the volonté gé-
nérale of the community forged together by the “social contract”.44 Kant, lastly, committed 
to the law the achievement of autonomy at the political level, enabling therefore the citizens 
to translate the highest principle of moral life into the social dimension.45 Despite the differ-
ences, in contract theory law never finds its justification and validation in its specific form 
and language, which is rather passed over with a certain degree of indifference, but always 
in an external ontology of the individual, expressed by those rights that are respectively re-
garded by every single author as essential and inalienable for the ontological constitution of 
the subject.  
 
 
2. Law As Self-reliant System 
 
If most legal theorists explicitly refer the validity of the law to an ontological basis outside 
the legal system, a second, more recent strand has tried to pursue a different, if not oppo-
site, strategy. According to these authors, the validity of the law has to be sought, internally, 
in the logical structure, i.e. in the specific rationality, of the legal system itself. Also within 
this strand we should differentiate between two variants, quite distant from each other as 
regards the respective epistemological premises: legal positivism (a), and systems theory (b). 
a) In his “pure theory of law” Hans Kelsen rejects firmly the idea that the law should re-
sort, so as to found its validity, to any social realities or ethical as well as moral principles.46 
                                                 
42  Thomas Hobbes, De Cive [1642], Royston, London 1651; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, 
Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, Crooke, London 1651. 
43  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government [1690], Awnsham-Churchill, London 1698. 
44  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contract social, ou principes du droit politique [1762], Garnier-
Flammarion, Paris 1966. 
45  Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten [1785], in: Immanuel Kant, Werkausgabe, 
hrsg. von Wilhelm Weischedel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1977, Vol. VII, at 65; Immanuel Kant, Über 
den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis [1793], in: 
Kant, Werkausgabe, Vol. XI, at 150; Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf 
[1795], in: Kant, Werkausgabe, Vol. XI, at 204; Immanuel Kant, Der Streit der Fakultäten [1798], in: 
Kant, Werkausgabe, Vol. XI, at. 364; Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten [1797], in: Kant, 
Werkausgabe, Vol. VIII, § 46, at 432. 
46  Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, Deuticke, 
Leipzig/Wien 1934, at 21. 
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In his understanding, the legal system – which is regarded as strictly self-referential – is 
made up of hypothetical propositions, the validity of which is guaranteed only by the fact 
that their production follows the rules established by a higher norm.47 Therefore, in the for-
mal pyramid of legal positivism the validity of any proposition is founded on the validity of a 
norm situated at a hierarchically higher level. Yet, the logic of such a conception leads ines-
capably to a regression ad infinitum, so that Kelsen – in order to avoid this conceptual short-
coming that would undermine his whole construction – creates a borderline concept of legal 
theory, the Grundnorm (fundamental norm).48 When we reach the top of the positivistic le-
gal system’s pyramid – i.e., the constitution within the national legal system and, at an even 
higher, global level, the essential norms of international law – we find, according to Kelsen, 
sets of positive norms on which all other norms are grounded. Nonetheless, these positive 
norms, so as to be valid, have also themselves to be based on another, even more essential 
norm. In order to interrupt the regression ad infinitum, Kelsen describes this most funda-
mental of all norms as non-positive, namely as a pre-positive principle which is the source of 
any validity of the law. The Grundnorm may actually assume any content: the only quality 
that is essential to the pre-positive principle of the whole legal system is its effectiveness.49 
Kelsen’s failure to justify convincingly the self-reference of the legal system as a system 
of self-reliant propositions – which he shares with legal positivism in general –50 is lastly due 
to his understanding of the legal language not as a system of propositions the meaning of 
which is depending on its use by the epistemic community, but as a strictly organized set of 
judgements, the validity and truth content of which is from the outset given by its position 
within the hierarchical scale.51 From this point of view, even interpretation is a monological 
                                                 
47  Id., at 22. 
48  Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge/Ma. 1949 (1st ed. 
1945), at 115 ff. 
49  Id., at 120.  
50  H. L. A. Hart tried to avoid Kelsen’s somehow obscure, explicitly pre-positive and implicitly effectiveness-
based concept of the Grundnorm by introducing the notion of the “rule of recognition” (The Concept of 
Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994, at 100 et seq.). Yet, it is Hart himself who eventually admits that the 
“rule of recognition” is lastly not a proper rule of the legal system since “in the day-to-day life of a legal 
system its rule of recognition is very seldom expressly formulated as a rule” (id., at 101). Thus, if the “rule 
of recognition” is not a proper rule of the legal system, it must be – analogously to Kelsen’s Grundnorm –a 
pre-positive and in the most cases implicit assumption which provides “both private persons and officials 
… with authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules of obligation” (id., at 100). Furthermore, the 
“rule of recognition” is not specifically connected with reflexive processes of rule acceptance and demo-
cratic legitimacy. Indeed, Hart contends that “the existence of a legal system is a social phenomenon 
which always presents two aspects,” on the one hand “the attitudes and behaviour involved in the volun-
tary acceptance of rules,” on the other “the simpler attitudes and behaviour involved in mere obedience 
or acquiescence” (ib., at 201). Nor is the “rule of recognition” necessarily tied to moral criteria. In fact, ac-
cording to Hart “a concept of law which allows the invalidity of law to be distinguished from its immorali-
ty, enables us to see the complexity and variety of these separate issues; whereas a narrow concept of 
law which denies legal validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to them” (ib., at 211). Concluding, although 
Hart’s “rule of recognition” comes out as more nuanced and less dogmatic than Kelsen’s Grundnorm, the 
factual validity of a norm and, in general, its effectiveness seem to be, also in Hart’s understanding, the ul-
timate – if not the only – criterion for the identification of what law is. And, given that the validity of the 
law rests therefore, also in Hart’s interpretation, lastly on extra-legal circumstances, the claim to self-
reliance of the legal system is by no means more stringent here than in Kelsen’s “reine Rechtslehre”. 
51  While Kelsen’s failure to justify convincingly the assumed self-reliance of the legal system is largely shared 
by Hart (see supra n. 50), the same similarity cannot be detected as regards their conceptions of the lan-
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technique, consisting in applying the law to the individual case, and not a discursive proce-
dure which has to justify itself before the community of those who are involved in the legal 
interaction and thus contribute – implicitly or explicitly – to the definition of its terms.52 Yet, 
if legal propositions do not find their significance within the discursive context of the legal 
community, the system of the law developed by legal positivists – although analyzed as a 
linguistic structure – remains bound to a traditional and non-dialogical, somehow backward 
idea of “meaning”, still far away from what has been described as the “linguistic turn”.53 
b) According to Niklas Luhmann’s theory of systems, law is an independent social sub-
system the function of which consists in stabilizing the normative expectations deriving from 
other social subsystems.54 Following the interpretation of society based on systems theory, 
every social subsystem produces expectations as a consequence of the achievement of its 
functions. In order to prevent the disruptive effects that could arise from the pretensions 
formulated by social actors, their expectations are expressed in the form of norms, and the 
claims appealing to these norms are dealt with through formal procedures following the 
principles laid down by law. Given these premises, the assertion of the self-subsistence of 
the legal subsystem is nevertheless problematic. Systems theory claims, in fact, that the legal 
subsystem – like any other social subsystem – only operationalizes communication that un-
folds according to its specific internal binary code55 which is based, for this particular subsys-
tem, on the contraposition between lawful and unlawful.56 This assumption may simply 
mean what is self-evident in a context of social differentiation, namely that inputs from out-
side can be operationalized within a system only if they are translated into its own language. 
Systems theory however – at least in Luhmann’s interpretation – maintains more than just 
this, asserting that no extra-systemic actor can become part of the infra-systemic interaction 
if he does not give up his extra-systemic dimension, as well as that no external content can 
penetrate into the causal chain of the infra-systemic operations. Indeed, every subsystem 
not only has its own rationality but is also self-referential, i.e., its operational chain is im-
permeable to the environment.57 Communications coming from outside are interpreted ex-
clusively as “irritations” affecting the usual functioning of infra-systemic operations.58 In fact, 
no extra- or supra-systemic reason – i.e., a rationality rooted in the “lifeworld” –59 is thinka-
ble in systems theory’s conception of self-contained social subsystems.  
In line with the epistemological premises of systems theory, law is also understood as a 
self-referential subsystem characterized by a self-sufficient rationality: the law would there-
fore be based exclusively on itself. Two problems arise, however: the first concerning the 
relation between law’s rationality and language; the second regarding the assumed self-
referentiality of systemic rationality. First, the rationality of the law – and thus also its validi-
ty – is, from the perspective of systems theory, not a linguistic rationality, based on argu-
                                                                                                                                                        
guage of the law. On Hart’s innovative interpretation of the connection between law and language, see in-
fra, III.4. 
52  Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, supra n. 46, at 90 ff. 
53  See: infra, IV. 
54  Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., at 131. 
55  Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a M. 
56  Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, supra n. 54, at 60 ff. 
57  Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, supra n. 55, at 65, 95 ff. 
58  Id., at 118. 
59  Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1981. 
 MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2016-08 14 
 
mentation and dialogic communication, but a functional one, only aiming to improve the ef-
ficiency of social performances. Second, even if we accept a concept of rationality just lim-
ited to functionality, it is at least questionable whether subsystems in general, and the legal 
subsystem in particular, can really be regarded as self-reliant. Indeed, the idea of an exclu-
sively self-reliant rationality of the legal subsystem meets its limits when the epistemological 
question is raised whether the membrane between system and environment can actually be 
seen as impenetrable and, as a consequence, whether the adaptations of the system’s oper-
ations to the environment can adequately be explained merely by resorting to the concept 
of “irritation.” An alternative description of the relations between system and environment 
would consist in presupposing the intervention of external actors as well as the raising of 
non-system-immanent claims within the communication process of the legal subsystem. 
From this perspective, provided that the external actors’ action and the non-system-
immanent claims are translated into the language of the legal subsystem, it would be possi-
ble to explain how the system-immanent rationality can benefit from direct input from the 
lifeworld. Furthermore, it would not be necessary to assume – as in Luhmann’s systems the-
ory – an epistemologically and sociologically problematic double-blind coupling between dif-
ferent non-communicating systems.60 The advantages of the approach that presupposes in-
teraction with external actors as well as the existence of an extra- and supra-systemic ra-
tionality becomes evident when it comes to the analysis of extra- or supra-systemic phe-
nomena like human rights protection and justice. The difficulties that systems theory meets 
in explaining these issues by maintaining the principle of systemic self-referentiality61 may 
offer sufficient evidence that the legal subsystem, even if relying on the conceptual organon 
of systems theory, can hardly be seen as self-sufficient: in order to understand some aspects 
of its functions the resort to forms of extra-legal rationality seems to be inevitable. As a re-
sult, the deficit of the attempt by systems theory to validate the law by itself is twofold: on 
the one hand, the assertion that “law is what law deems to be law”62 refers to a functional 
and not – as it could be assumed at first glance – to a linguistic dimension; on the other, 
even from the functional point of view self-referentiality is not assured. 
 
 
3. Law and Social Power 
 
The emphasis on the connections between legal concepts and social power is not a new top-
ic in political and legal thought. Indeed, it can be traced back at least as far as to the Soph-
ists, as testified in Plato’s Republic, in which Thrasymachus is reported to explicitly state that 
                                                 
60  Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, supra n. 55, at 100. 
61  See, e.g.: Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung. Die Geltungsbegründung der Menschenrechte, Vel-
brück Wissenschaft, Weilerswist 2005; Andreas Fischer-Lescano, ‘Globalverfassung: Verfassung der Welt-
gesellschaft’ [2002], 88 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 349; Marcelo Neves, ‘Die symbolische 
Kraft der Menschenrechte’ [2005], 91 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 159; Gunther Teubner, 
‘Selbstsubversive Gerechtigkeit. Kontingenz- oder Transzendenzformel des Rechts?’ [2008], 29 Zeitschrift 
für Rechtssoziologie 9; Gunther Teubner, Die anonyme Matrix, in: Winfried Brugger, Ulfried Neumann and 
Stephan Kirste (eds.), Rechtsphilosophie im 21. Jahrhundert, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 2008, at 440. 
62  Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, supra n. 54, at 143 ff. (engl.: Law as a Social System, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2004, 157). 
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“justice … is the interest of the stronger.”63 Yet, Plato let Socrates successfully reject Thra-
symachus’ argument – and in fact, since then, the idea of the reliance of law’s interpretation 
on social power, although re-emerging again and again, was rather doomed to marginality in 
front of the prevailing conception of the law as a system of norms containing normative 
truths and shared values. The interpretation of the law as essentially power-related reap-
peared – but then with a significantly higher impact – in the middle of the 19th century. In 
the Manifesto of the Communist Party of 1848 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels asserted une-
quivocally that the “jurisprudence [of the ruling class, or of the bourgeoisie] is but the will of 
[this] class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are deter-
mined by the economical conditions of existence of [this] class.”64 As a consequence, no le-
gal system can justifiably claim to be just per se; to the contrary, it will be just – or unjust – 
depending on the role played at that specific historical moment by the social class, the inter-
ests of which it represents. The validity of the law, thus, is not determined by its inherent 
quality or by its argumentative justification, but by its position within a teleological under-
standing of history. 
The Marxist idea of the dependence of the legal system on the priorities of the ruling 
class was highly influential among many progressive social movements and leftist thinkers, 
far beyond the circle of those who believed in a largely deterministic teleology of social 
emancipation. Yet, whereas the most radical Marxist approach diminished the law to a mere 
instrument of the ruling class, thus actually unworthy to be taken seriously, a couple of dec-
ades later and in a completely different intellectual and political environment a further theo-
retical conception emerged as a form of internal criticism of the legal system carried out by 
legal scholars. It was, in fact, the American legal realism that developed a theoretical frame-
work that rejected the claim to self-reliance both of the legal system and of jurisprudence 
and emphasized the connections of the law with moral and political assumptions as well as 
with the social reality as a whole, yet not as the result of external observation or of a general 
Weltanschauung, but on the basis of the internal analysis of legal categories.65  
The scholarly accent on the social contextuality of law came to merge with the pro-
gressive impulse to unveil it as a (possible) instrument of the consolidation of injustice within 
the movement of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS), to which the intellectual personality of 
Martti Koskenniemi is tied in many respects. Although it is almost impossible to lead back 
the manifold CLS movement to a unitary position, its most essential tenets can be identified, 
nevertheless, by resorting to the work of Roberto Unger, unquestionably one of the most 
theoretically ambitious exponents of the movement. In his book dedicated to The Critical 
Legal Studies Movement, Unger starts by criticizing the most dominant approaches in legal 
theory. The first is “formalism” which is defined as “a commitment to, and therefore also a 
belief in the possibility of, a method of legal justification that contrasts with open-ended dis-
putes about the basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, 
or visionary.”66 In other words, law is affected by “formalism” if it is understood as a system 
                                                 
63  Plato, The Republic, supra n. 29, Book I, 338c. 
64  Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, Reclam, Stuttgart 1969, at 42. 
65  Günter Frankenberg, Partisanen der Rechtskritik: Critical Legal Studies etc., in: Sonja Buckel, Ralph Chris-
tensen, Andreas Fischer-Lescano (eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2006, at 97 et 
seq. 
66  Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Ma.)/London 1983, at 1. 
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of norms detached from the society and pretending, thus, to be self-referent. The second 
highly influential, but nevertheless false approach is “objectivism”, which is described as 
“the belief that the authoritative legal materials – the system of statutes, cases, and accept-
ed legal ideas – embody and sustain a defensible scheme of human association.”67 In the 
“objectivistic” conception of law the problem is therefore almost the opposite to the former 
mistaken vision, the deficit consisting here in depriving the norms of any autonomy and con-
sidering them as the sheer embodiment of a state of things which is assumed to be morally 
or functionally correct. To the contrary, according to Unger, law has to assume the role of 
supporting social change. This role has been already taken on by the law in the past, in par-
ticular during the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Ages.68 In the course of 
this epochal passage, the law gave up its former function as “a defense of the underlying or-
der of social division and hierarchy,”69 assuming the task to “describe the basic possible 
dealings among people, as property owners and as citizens, without regard to the place indi-
viduals occupy within existing society.”70 Thus, if the role of the law in the Modern Ages has 
consisted in developing the “system of rights”, in the transition from modernity to post-
modernity also the challenge for the legal system has changed. In our time, its most essential 
mission – backed by what Unger calls a “deviationist” or “expanded doctrine” –71 should be 
to identify the lines of rupture in society and to support emancipation72 as well as bottom-
up forms of participatory or “empowered” democracy.73  
Hence, the philosophy of the CLS movement, as it has been formulated by one of its 
most prominent scholars, can be tentatively summarized as follows. First, the legal system 
cannot be regarded as a self-sufficient set of norms with no connections to moral assump-
tions and social conditions. Second, law which does not fall shorter of its potentialities can-
not be interpreted as a system of norms simply mirroring the existent conditions of social 
power either. Third, the relationship between law and society has a dialectic character, in 
the sense that the interpreters of the law and, in general, the legal professionals have to be 
made aware, on the one hand, of the social rootedness of norms; on that basis, they have to 
identify, on the other hand, the progressive tendencies in society, using then the instru-
ments put at disposal by the law to support and implement those tendencies. Forth and as a 
consequence of the former points, the source of the validity of the law is located in social 
reality, yet in a highly selective way; indeed, the validity of the law is depending on its capac-
ity – or, to put it more correctly, on the capacity of its interpreters – to make out social 
trends that may push forward the empowerment of citizens and to foster them.  
 
 
4. Law and Language 
 
The awareness that law is not (only) expression of an ontological truth or of formal and ab-
stract principles of rationality, but is (also) deeply rooted in language emerged for the first 
                                                 
67  Id., at 2. 
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time as a product of the German Historical School. It was Friedrich Carl von Savigny, indeed, 
who contended that “where we find the first evidences of history, there the … law has al-
ready its specific character, which is typical for a certain nation (Volk).”74 As a result, we can 
always observe an “organic connection of the law with the essence and the character of the 
nation.”75 In other words, the law should be regarded as one of the most relevant manifesta-
tions of the “spirit of the people” (Volksgeist), i.e., of the “national character” of a cultural 
and also – at least in the wishes of the romantic nationalists – political community. Further-
more, since the language is the most essential feature of the culture of the Volk, it is the na-
tional language indeed that serves as the substrate on which the correlation is built between 
legal rules and the life of the national community. Therefore, the law can only be the law of 
a specific nation – and thus a living law, not simply a sclerotic system of abstract norms – be-
cause it is permeated by the language of the Volk. Savigny summarizes his thought as fol-
lows: “the law is formed in the language; it takes a scientific shape and, as it lived before 
within the consciousness of the whole nation, it passes now to the consciousness of the law-
yers.”76 Hence, if it is true that Savigny drew for the first time the attention to the linguistic 
essence of the law, this happened in his interpretation only in the sense that the linguistic 
form allows the law to correlate with its social fundament which is understood, here, as the 
culture of the nation. As a result, the analysis of the language of the law does not lead in Sa-
vigny to any specifically linguistic method, but is lastly reduced to the outlining of the histori-
cal and cultural constants of the national legal systems. 
If for the Historical School, therefore, language was just the conveyer that connects the 
law to its true essence, namely to the Volksgeist, in a further step meaning and validity of 
legal propositions were not to be sought beneath the linguistic surface, but in the language 
itself. It was H. L. A. Hart who introduced this significant development by “provocatively ex-
tend[ing] Wittgenstein’s later thought to law.”77 The reference is, here, to Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations, in which he developed the revolutionary idea that the meaning 
of language depends exclusively on the use that we make of it.78 Thus, the question is how 
“Hart’s conception of jurisprudence is representative of Wittgenstein’s conception of philos-
ophy.”79. In fact, if we look at the methodology applied in Hart’s analysis, we can discover 
that he does not search for the essence of the law, or for its true definition, but simply de-
scribes the structure of the language of the law. In other words, he presents what the lan-
guage of the law is made of – more concretely, private and public primary rules, secondary 
rules, as well as rules of adjudication and of change.80 In this sense, he acts methodologically 
precisely in the same way as Wittgenstein does with reference to more general philosophical 
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questions concerning the meaning of language. While Wittgenstein traces back the signifi-
cance of propositions to the “ordinary” language and to its concrete use, Hart finds no deep-
er content of the law than the linguistic features of its actual unfolding. Summing up, “ordi-
nary language is binding for philosopher and jurist alike, not because an everyday or com-
monsense perspective is in itself normative but because ordinary language is their own, the 




IV. Koskenniemi’s Radicalization of the Limguistic Turn in Legal Philosophy 
 
Having outlined the main contents of Koskenniemi’s epistemology, on the one hand, and 
having summarized the most significant strands of legal philosophy with reference to those 
contents on the other, it is now possible to evaluate how innovative Koskenniemi’s approach 
is by locating the single elements of his conception against the background from which he 
sets himself apart. Significantly, only the tenets of the first strand are completely rejected by 
Koskenniemi, whereas he shares the fundamental assumptions that characterize the other 
approaches. Yet, he radicalizes them in a way which eventually leads to conceptual results 
which either were only sketched in the former conceptions, or go explicitly beyond their 
horizon. 
1) All strands of legal philosophy presented in the former Section assert the truth con-
tent of the law as the source of its validity, although – as I will show in the following – in a 
quite different manner. The first of them sought it outside the legal system, more precisely 
in the ontological foundation of social order. Depending on the different paradigms of order, 
the foundation of social order was located in the “just” politeia or in the enlarged family, in 
the nation or in the communitas christiana, in the whole of human kind or in the individuals. 
Some of the solutions may belong definitively to the past. So, for instance, the reference to 
the “just” politeia, to the enlarged family, or to a universal communitas christiana. Yet, 
Koskenniemi rejects also those proposals which are still influential. For the international 
lawyer committed to the worldwide guarantee of peace and fundamental human rights the 
nation is inevitably a too narrow horizon. Furthermore, he criticizes explicitly the theory of 
the constitutionalization of international law,82 therefore implicitly denying also the ontolog-
ical assumption on which it is based, i.e., the existence of a global human community with 
shared values and interests.83 Finally, he reduces Kant’s global constitutionalism – and the 
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universalistic individualism in which it is rooted – from a deontological argument aiming to 
justify an obligation, to a “mindset” devoid of cognitive ambitions.84 
2) Koskenniemi shares with the authors of the second strand the conviction that the 
legal system should be regarded as self-reliant. But, unlike the most legal positivists and sys-
tems theorists, he takes the claim seriously. In fact, we have seen in the former Section that 
some of the most prominent exponents of both approaches – specifically, Kelsen and Hart 
for legal positivism, and Luhmann and Teubner for systems theory – eventually locate the 
ultimate source of the validity of the law outside the legal system, respectively in the effec-
tiveness of the Grundnorm and in the realistic content of the “rule of recognition” on the 
one hand, as well as in the functional rationality of the social system on the other. Instead, 
Koskenniemi refuses these solutions in the same way as he declines any other recourse to 
external and objective sources of the validity of the law. Furthermore, the legal system de-
scribed by legal positivists and system theorists is assumed to be internally coherent insofar 
as it is regarded as rooted in a consistent idea of rationality. On the contrary, one of the 
most essential tenets of Koskenniemi’s epistemology consists precisely in the assertion that 
the linguistic analysis of the legal discourse demonstrates its lack of internal consistency. 
3) Koskenniemi also agrees on the close relation between law and social power. Yet, 
unlike many authors who stressed this correlation before him, he rules out that the norma-
tive quality of the law could be improved by simply resorting to social change. The point, 
here, is that Koskenniemi does not maintain that social relations can entail the source of 
law’s validity. In this sense, social power is no less inadequate than any other external foun-
dation of the law. We would misunderstand the specific quality of legal formalism if we be-
lieve that a law has to be rejected as unjust because of an intrinsic connection with a social 
state of affairs that defies the most essential criteria of justice. And we would be no less 
wrong – always according to Koskenniemi – if we assume that a legal system would become 
just only by changing its social basis, i.e., by enforcing the criteria of justice and, concretely, 
by empowering those who have to obey the rules. Indeed, in Koskenniemi’s view law has no 
immanent relation to the conditions of social power: it is not inherently just (or unjust) be-
cause its social basis is deemed to be just (or unjust). To the contrary, law should be regard-
ed as a formal instrument, the quality of which, in terms of justice, depends exclusively on 
the decisions of the legal professional who makes use of it.  
4) The authors who laid emphasis to the linguistic dimension of law were motivated by 
the endeavour to find a more suitable basis for law’s validity in front of the rising crisis of 
universalistic rationality. Since a reliable and convincing foundation for the assertion of a 
universally acceptable truth content of the law was assumed to be missing, the anchoring of 
the law in the language of a national community or in the “ordinary language” could guaran-
tee, at least, for a contextual validity (and even truth content). Koskenniemi resumes the 
idea of law as a language – and the still ground-breaking character of his attempt becomes 
even more evident if we consider the on-going efforts to revitalize natural law theories 
through neo-metaphysical interpretations.85 However, Koskenniemi’s conception of law as a 
language does not aim at searching for a post-metaphysical and post-ontological fundament 
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for the truth claim of the law. Rather, he detaches the language of the law also from the 
shared agreements on meaning of a limited community. In doing so, he starts with Wittgen-
stein, but goes a long way beyond him. In particular, Koskenniemi incorporates a poststruc-
turalist element into the Wittgensteinian architecture: resorting to Derrida’s “deconstruc-
tion”86, he uses “the language against itself”,87 showing that the language of the law devel-




V. Arguments for a Post-Metaphysical Understanding of the Truth Content of Language 
 
By “linguistic turn” we understand the pathbreaking metamorphose in 20th century’s West-
ern philosophy that deeply changed the understanding not just of language and of its rela-
tion to the world of phenomena and actions, but also of truth itself.88 According to the tradi-
tional view, the “true” meaning of a word or of a proposition is depending on their correct 
reference to objects or connections between objects in the “real”, i.e. non-linguistic, world. 
Following the “linguistic turn”, instead, the meaning of the language is sought in the lan-
guage itself, in its use and in the praxis of action implied by it. Therefore, “truth” – insofar as 
it is admitted to exist – is not something located in the connection between linguistic propo-
sitions and the world, but it is rather embedded in the pragmatics of communication.89 By 
analyzing the legal discourse through the characteristics of its language and by assessing its 
validity by means of resorting to the methods of linguistics and philosophy of language, 
Koskenniemi reasserts and reinforces the “linguistic turn” in his discipline. Yet, Koskenniemi 
does not just turn attention to the linguistic dimension of law. He goes a step further by 
claiming that the language of the law has no truth content. This assertion may be interpret-
ed in two different ways: as a general assumption that language works actually without any 
reference to a truth content of propositions (1), or as a claim that, even if language in gen-
eral has a truth content, it is the language of the law, specifically, which has none (2). Let us 
consider the two possible and divergent implications of Koskenniemi’s epistemology sepa-
rately. 
1) If we look back at the history of epistemology, we cannot but acknowledge that the 
historically predominant attitude was the assumption that utterances have a meaning essen-
tially because they refer to an external – i.e. non-linguistic – object and that this relationship 
between the elements of language and the non-linguistic world accounts for the truth con-
tent of the language. Some distinctions from a strict “objectivistic” theory of language had 
been made already in more or less distant times – such as the “nominalistic” interpretation 
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of universal or abstract concepts introduced in the late Middle Ages,90 or the differentiation 
between “sense” and “meaning” elaborated in the late 19th century.91 But it was Ludwig 
Wittgenstein who claimed for the first time that we can understand each other through our 
linguistic communication by just relying on linguistic habits and without resorting to any as-
sumption of a more-than-contextual truth content of our utterances.92 This is precisely the 
epistemology and philosophy of language that Koskenniemi puts at the basis of his works on 
international law. Going even a step further, he radicalizes Wittgenstein’s approach by deny-
ing any attribution of a consolidated meaning to propositions, even if this meaning is charac-
terized by a short-ranged and only contextual scope. However, Wittgenstein’s sceptical con-
textualism has not found many supporters in the later developments of the philosophy of 
language, leaving its radicalization by Koskenniemi all the more to rest on a rather shaky 
epistemological ground. This does not come as a surprise, due to the quasi-nihilist effects 
that Wittgenstein’s approach may have had on the theory of knowledge, which could have 
been even more disruptive for other branches of human thought than for legal philosophy. 
Thus, a large part of the efforts made by philosophers of language in the last decades was 
dedicated to the reconstruction of a non-sceptical truth theory. Without going too much into 
details, let us single out two of these post-Wittgensteinian approaches, simply as a clue that 
the epistemological way taken by Koskenniemi is not without alternatives. 
a) A first answer to a possible sceptical drift in the theory of knowledge as a result of 
the Wittgensteinian “turn” can be described as a renewal of the tradition of the empiristic 
philosophy of language and is prominently expressed in the works of Donald Davidson. The 
loss of reference to the concrete object within the post-ontological and post-mentalistic un-
derstanding of language is countered by Davidson through the return to a kind of “objectiv-
ism” that bears the distinctive traits of a pre-intersubjective, if not even of a pre-subjective 
epistemology. So as to reach his goal, he pursues a twofold strategy. First, he distances him-
self from Descartes’ subjectivism by asserting that doubt itself is an idea of the truth which is 
based on a natural knowledge of the reality and of its objects.93 By this reference to the pos-
sibility of a pre-reflexive knowledge of reality Davidson takes a position that, due to the al-
leged spontaneous and natural osmosis – which he calls “holism” – between our cognizance 
and the world outside, recalls quite clearly essential elements of the pre-Cartesian episte-
mology. Coherently, Davidson goes so far as to say that, precisely as a result of this alleged 
quasi-natural osmosis, empiric knowledge would not need any epistemological justifica-
tion.94 
Yet, Davidson recognizes – rather from a methodological than from an ontological or 
hermeneutic standpoint – that the process of cognizance does not happen solipsistically, but 
is socially mediated through the communication between the speaker and the interpret.95 
Here he develops his second strategy for the consolidation of an epistemological (re-)turn to 
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objectivism by working out a theory of communication which can be considered insofar 
“pre-intersubjective” as communication is assumed to function even without a normatively 
significant mutual recognition96, or an interpretation of society as a communicative commu-
nity. From the perspective of Davidson’s theory, the interaction of speaker and interpret 
does not aim at the exchange of arguments, or at the implementation of the normative fun-
daments of social life. Rather, it concentrates – in a kind of triangle modus – on the compari-
son of the reactions to the stimuli that the external object can produce on both participants 
in the interaction. Linguistic communication results in mutual understanding if the linguistic 
reaction to the stimuli happens in a way that can be clearly interpreted by the counterpart.97 
The comparability – and therefore also the interpretability – of the individual reactions are 
ensured by the fact that all participants in the linguistic interaction are innately embedded in 
a “common language”.98 
b) Davidson, thus, rescues the truth content of language and avoids the risk of a scep-
tical drift, which is implied in the contextual linguistics developed by Wittgenstein, by shift-
ing attention again on the external object. The result is attained, however, at the high cost of 
rejecting the normatively unreduced, properly intersubjective dimension of language as ex-
change of arguments. In the latest philosophy of language we can find, yet, another strand in 
which the truth content is maintained, but within an unequivocally intersubjective setting. 
This is the way chosen by Robert Brandom in his language theory, the goal of which consists 
in making “explicit” the “implicit” rules of an inferential semantics, characterized by the ex-
change of reasons and arguments through the linguistic communication.99 Indeed, only an 
idea of communication as an exchange of arguments takes full account of the novelty intro-
duced by the “linguistic turn”. However, if the first hurdle, the Scylla consisting in the danger 
of wiping out the social dimension of communication by concentrating only on the external 
object, has been successfully passed by conceiving a truly intersubjective communication 
theory, a second threat is yet to be mastered, namely the Charybdis of skepticism or the re-
jection of what has been called the “truth’s universal claim”.100 Without this further step, we 
would fall back into that kind of Wittgensteinian epistemological skepticism the deficits of 
which have been targeted by contemporary language theory. Brandom meets this second 
challenge by construing an epistemological continuum between “facts”, “concepts” and 
“true claims”.101 Since “concepts” are articulated in an inferential modus – that means, are 
not regarded as mere representation of objects, but always in the context of propositions 
based on arguments –, they build the theoretical bridge that brings “facts” and “true claims” 
together. Indeed, both “facts” referring to external objects, as well as “true claims” concern-
ing these same objects, are structured as “concepts” and therefore inferentially. As a result, 
an ontological overlapping is assumed to exist between the “facts” of the world and our as-
sertions expressing truth claims as regards the same objects of the world: “facts are just true 
claims“, is Brandom’s lapidary statement.102 The outcome of this overlaying of “facts” and 
“true claims” consists, first, in a theory of knowledge that avoids skepticism by comprehend-
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ing into the discourse references to concrete objects, although always conceived of in an in-
ferential way, and second in a kind of neo-idealistic understanding of communication,103 
clearly influenced by Brandom’s original revival of Hegel’s epistemology.104 
2) However, even if we have to admit that the idea that communication is only contex-
tual, missing any convincing resort to what can be called an “objective reality”, is rather 
marginal in today’s theory and philosophy of language, we could also assume that Kosken-
niemi’s criticism does not target the truth content of language in general, but just the truth 
content of the legal language. In other words, the question that we can pose is: should we 
assume that, if not the language in general, at least the language of the law is actually devoid 
of truth claims? Once again, yet, the position seems not to be supported, in its radical as-
sumption, by contemporary philosophy of language. Let us briefly see which answer is given 
to this question by the already introduced approaches: the neo-objectivistic, on the one 
hand, and the inferential on the other. In both cases, yet, we have to broaden the question 
by switching the focus from the truth claims of the legal language, in particular, to the wider 
field of the truth claims of languages that imply the use of practical reason. In other words, 
to find an answer to the question, we have to change, in the taxonomy of the use of practi-
cal reason, from the species of legal language to the more general genus of the language ad-
dressing issues concerning the use of practical reason. 
a) Davidson extends his neo-objectivistic understanding of truth in language also to 
propositions addressing moral or ethical questions. From his perspective, ethical values are 
insofar “objective” as they are regarded as given in a quasi-natural way within the social 
group of reference of the speaker.105 In this sense, the social substrate of ethical convictions 
plays, with regard to the ethical discourse, the same role taken by the “objective” external 
world within the theoretical discourse. By presuming that ethical values have a quasi-natural 
basis in social convictions, however, we prevent ourselves from the possibility that values 
have universal validity – since social convictions may vary from time to time and from place 
to place –, as well as from the chance of determining a criterion for validity which could 
stand as a fundament for the scrutiny of values presently existing in society. 
b) Although remarkably different in its epistemological premises, also Brandom’s in-
ferential semantics leads, when applied to questions concerning the use of practical reason, 
to conclusions which are quite similar to those drawn by Davidson from his objectivistic the-
ory of language. In particular, Brandom widens the ontological overlapping between “facts”, 
“concepts” and “true claims” also to the “norms”, going thus beyond theoretical reason and 
reaching the field of practical reason as well.106 From his point of view, moral and ethical 
norms share the same status as descriptive propositions with truth claim: all of them – 
“norms” as well as “truth claims” – make the rules “explicit” which have their objective fun-
dament in the “facts” of the world.107 
We can thus conclude that both Davidson’s neo-objectivistic and Brandom’s inferential 
philosophy of language regard rules derived from the use of practical reason – and there-
fore, we may add, also legal rules – as something given, an “object” or “fact” of the world 
that communication, if it is to achieve its goal, cannot but accept. This way, however, com-
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munication turns out to miss, eventually, the constructive dimension that characterizes the 
use of practical reason. By proposing arguments to mutual consideration, indeed, moral and 
ethical discourses do not just take reality into account but also build a dimension that can, in 





VI. Some Considerations on the Intersubjective Truth Content of the Law and the Need for 
Justification in the Legal Profession 
 
In contrast to Koskenniemi’s epistemology, it seems – on the basis of the analysis carried out 
in the former section – that the most significant strands of contemporary philosophy of lan-
guage do not share Wittgenstein’s scepticism with regard to the truth content either of the 
theoretical or of the practical dimension of linguistic communication, implicitly rejecting, a 
fortiori, also any further radicalization of it. Both the neo-objectivistic theory and its inferen-
tial counterpart reassert, on the one hand, the possibility of a true knowledge, and expand 
the truth claim to propositions addressing issues of practical reason on the other. Yet, the 
affirmation of the truth claim of moral, ethical and legal propositions is lastly grounded on 
the reduction of the truth content of practical reason to the mere reproduction of existing 
rules. Still, this is precisely what Koskenniemi tries to avoid with his legal philosophy: from 
his standpoint, the legal professional has to construe, or even create, his or her interpreta-
tion of the existing rules so as to use them for the sake of the forsaken. If the truth content 
should consist just in the safeguard of the status quo, then we would probably do better in-
deed – with Koskenniemi – by simply ignoring it, insisting on the intuitive cognition that 
practical reason does comprehend also something different from the existing state of affairs.  
But is it really correct that practical reason can just have truth content as reaffirmation 
of existing rules? Or is it possible to find another definition of truth which is applicable also 
to propositions addressing questions of practical reason but without reducing them to the 
given situation? Can, in other words, rules “of our making” have a truth content?108 I claim, 
indeed, that it is possible. It depends, actually, on how truth is understood. We can draw 
some suggestions on this issue from the communicative paradigm of order, as it has been 
developed by Karl-Otto Apel109 and Jürgen Habermas.110 According to this approach linguis-
tic communication, so as to work, has always to be regarded as having a truth content. In 
other words, should we assume that the utterances of our counterpart in the linguistic inter-
action are devoid of any content that we can interpret as “true” – i.e. as having a meaning 
that we can share – we would not engage in any serious interaction with this actor, with the 
consequence that the interaction would end soon without results and the communication, 
as an exchange of meaningful utterances, would actually not take place at all. Concretely, in 
order to guarantee that communication works, the participants in the linguistic interaction 
must mutually presuppose that: a) from an objective perspective, the assertions are true (in 
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the sense that the propositions are referred to real situations or facts); b) from a subjective 
perspective, the speakers act truthfully (in the sense that they are committed to fair-minded 
purposes and are sincerely persuaded that their assertions meet the conditions for truth); c) 
from an intersubjective perspective, the speakers interact according to the principles of 
rightness (in the sense that they accept that their assertions have to meet the criteria for a 
general and mutual acknowledgement by all participants in the communication).111 From 
this standpoint, communication preserves (under a) the reference to the external object, 
which, however, does not constitute – like in the objectivistic theory of language – the only 
criterion for truth, nor it is conceived in idealistic terms like in Brandom’s semantics. Moreo-
ver, c) guarantees the inferential character of a communication made of exchange of argu-
ments. Lastly, b) and c) stand for the inherent normativity of the interaction. On the whole, 
communication understood in this form maintains the claims for a universal validity, but 
without any resort to ontological or metaphysical presumptions. 
If applied to the legal discourse, the communicative paradigm leads to consequences 
which are quite different from Koskenniemi’s view. On the one hand, the legal instruments 
as the objective sources of what we can call the “legal truth” – the external object which the 
presupposition a) of a successful communication refers to – seems to bear more importance 
and to be less available for individual strategies, or even manipulation. Second, the legal dis-
course is bound to an inherent normativity. In other words, law can display its social function 
and the legal discourse can unfold successfully only if law is seen as something different and 
more than just strategic thinking and acting. Third, legal “truth” is always connected to the 
discourse within the epistemic community, which comprehends lastly not only the legal pro-
fessionals but the entire society. Like in Koskenniemi’s legal theory, in communicative per-
spective the lawyer has the task to interpret the law, but, in order to realize its full norma-
tivity, he/she has to take into account the discourse within the epistemic community and has 
to justify his/her interpretation before it.112 Therefore, the critical interpretation of the exist-
ing law is not just possible but downright necessary; yet, it should be seen as the result not 
only of the commitment of the individual lawyer but of a broader social discourse that the 
lawyer has the task to translate into the language of his/her discipline.  
                                                 
111  Jürgen Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a. M. 1984, at 598; J. Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 
1988, at 73, 105 and 123; J. Habermas, Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 
2004, at 110. 
112  In his “Epilogue” to the second edition of From Apology to Utopia Koskenniemi replies to the idea of an 
intersubjective fundament of the legal discourse by simply confirming his skepticism about the possibility 
of establishing a connection between shared meanings and the language of the law and by reaffirming the 
creative activity of the legal professionals: “Hermeneutics is right in that intersubjectivity is important. But 
it is wrong to reduce the professional context to one that ‘operates on the basis of common understand-
ings and shared beliefs’ (Ian Johnstone, ‘Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communi-
ties’, 1991, 12 Michigan Journal of International Law 449). In fact we know virtually nothing of ‘under-
standings’ or ‘beliefs’: the insides of social agents remain irreducibly opaque. The interpretative tech-
niques lawyers use to proceed from a text or a behaviour to its ‘meaning’ create (and do not ‘reflect’) 
those meanings.” (Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra n. 1, at 597). However, he does not ad-
dress directly the arguments of the counterpart. 
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